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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NED 0. GREGERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v s • 
JAMES L. JENSEN and EDRA 
JENSEN, his wife, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16339 
This is an action by Appellant for specific performance 
of a contract to convey real property, or, in the alternative, 
for damages as to the reasonable value of said property. 
Respondents answered claiming there was no enforceable 
agreement between the parties and that the same was barred by 
the Statutes of Frauds. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury. 
At the completion of Plaintiff's case, the Court qranted 
judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's Complaint for 
Specific Performance, no cause of action. The Court however, 
granted judgment to Plaintiff and against Defendant in the 
sum of $350.00 plus interest at the rate of eight percent per 
annum from September 30th, 1971, together with Court costs 
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incurred, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the 
judgment of the trial court and ordPring that the agreement 
reached between Plaintiff and Defendants is specifically 
enforceable; or that this Court reverse the trial court and 
order that Plaintiff had establish, prima facie case that 
a contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants, and 
therefore that the trial court's judgment against Plaintiff, 
no cause of action, was in error; or, for an Order of the 
Supreme Court remanding the case to the trial court for a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Immediately prior to September 30th, 1971, Plaintiff/ 
Appellant GREGERSON, hereinafter referred to as GREGERSON, 
entered into negotiations with Defendants/Respondents JENSEN, 
hereinafter referred to as JENSEN, for the purchase of a 
portion of the only real property owned by JENSEN in Sanpete 
County, Utah. (Transcript of court proceedings hereinafter 
T) 11A:l9-30; 12:1-17; 45:25-30; 46:6-13; 47:1-10; 48:5-19. 
After an initial conversation at JENSEN's business, 
GREGERSON and JENSEN went to the property in question which 
is unimproved real property located directly in back of JENSEN's 
home in Gunnison, Utah. T 26:10-14. The property which the 
parties stood upon was enclosed by fences on all four sides. 
T 37:24-30. Thus a fence separated the subject property from 
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JENSEN's home. The property at that time was being used for 
pasture for JENSEN. T 38:8-9. 
In the presence of JENSEN and GREGERSON, the property 
was measured by one Don Anderson and GREGERSON's father who 
used a tape measure to evaluate where a building could set on 
the property. T 38:24-36; T 64:26-29. At least one iron stake 
was placed on one corner of the property. T 64:30; T 65:11-23. 
The corners determined by the survey coincided with the 
existing fences on the property. T 38:27-30. In measuring 
the property, Don Anderson used a tax notice describing the 
property and tried to evaluate what property was there accord-
ing to the tax notice. T 38:17-22. 
While JENSEN and GREGERSON were on the property, JENSEN 
kicked the dirt where a stake could be set up to determine 
the point of beginning and so as not to interfere with his 
cesspool and drain fields. T 46:10-ll; T 47:4-6. 
A conversation also took place while JENSEN and GREGERSON 
were on the property wherein JENSEN told GREGERSON that he 
would sell his property north of where he kicked the dirt. 
T 48:11-15. The parties at that time agreed to a total pur-
chase price of $700.00 for the subject property. T 12:2-9; 
T 48:18-19. On September 30th, 1971, GREGERSON delivered to 
JENSEN a check in the sum of $350.00 representing one-half of 
the purchase price. T 17:23-30; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
On the face of the check, in the handwriting of GREGERSON, is 
the following language in the lower lefthand corner: 
"l/2 payment on land as agreed - other l/2 
payment when deed delivered" 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A copy of this check is attached as an exhibit. 
The check for $350.00 was deposited to the joint bank 
account of J. L. JENSEN and EDRA JENSEN. T 60:16-22. 
JENSEN also told GREGERSON that the property had a 
mortgage on it and that he would get a partial release of 
mortgage from the bank as he had on a past occasion. T 12:12-
17; T 49:21-22. 
Shortly thereafter and apparently in October of 1971, 
a deed was prepared describing in detail the real property 
which is the subject of this action. T 50:23-29. A copy of 
said deed is attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff GREGERSON's 
Motion For a New Trial and supporting Affidavits, (Designa-
tion of Record on Appeal No. 18). A copy of said deed is 
also attached as an exhihit to this Brief. The knowledge 
of that deed was not communicated by JENSEN to GREGERSON 
or his attorney until the trial of this matter on the merits, 
even though Plaintiff GREGERSON had requested by interrogatory 
that information from Defendants JENSEN: 
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please state whether or 
not any other written documents exist concerning 
the property described in Interrogatory No. 2 
between Plaintiff and Defendants which were written 
or prepared on or about September 30th, 1971. If 
the answer to this is in the affirmative, please 
attach a copy of said instrument." 
Defendant JENSEN answered Interrogatory No. 14 as follows: 
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14: ANSWER: In answer 
to Interrogatory No. 14, there are not any documents 
that exist regarding the sale of said property." 
(Designation of Record on Appeal No. 8). 
The failure on the part of JENSEN to properly answer this 
-4-
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interrogatory was the substance of GREGERSON's Motion For A 
New Trial and based upon the finding of the trial court that 
a sufficient description did not exist which would allow the 
court to compel specific performance. That motion was denied 
by the court on the following basis: 
"That the existance of an unsigned document not 
prepared by the Defendant would still not make 
a prima facie case for Plaintiff." (Court Order 
dated January lst, 1979; Designation of Record 
on Appeal No. 24). 
When GREGERSON failed to receive a deed to the property, 
he made inquiry of JENSEN as to the status of the matter. 
T 21:4-7. JENSEN responded that he would get the deed to 
GREGERSON and get the matter completed. T 21 :7-9; T 22:6-ll. 
When JENSEN ultimately failed to deliver the deed, 
GREGERSON filed the instant action. 
The case was tried September 27th, 1978, before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge of the Sixth Judicial 
District. The court made the following Findings of Fact 
which are important for review on appeal: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
l. That the Plaintiff and Defendants entered into 
negotiations concerning the sale of the property described 
in Plaintiff's Complaint during the latter part of 
September, 1971. 
2. (Omitted for purposes of brevity). 
3. (Omitted for purposes of brevity). 
4. That the property examined by said parties was 
completely enclosed by a fence at the time it was measured. 
5. That the only parcel of property owned by De-
fendants in 1971 was the parcel of land located in 
Gunnison, Utah, upon which the Defendants' home is 
-5-
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now 
located and the property immediately north of Defendants' 
home which is the subject of this action. 
6. That on September 30th, 1971, the property which 
is the subject of this act 1 on was recorded in the official 
records of Sanpete County in the name of J. L. Jensen and 
his name only, and is presently recorded only in said 
Defendant's name. 
7. That no other written document evidencing a 
contract between Pl a i" tiff and Defendant was produced at 
trial by Plaintiff in support of his position. 
8. That Defendants have been in possession of the 
real property which is the subject of this action since 
September 30th, 1971, ,l·id have pi! i d the taxes on the 
same since that date, but have not made any improvements 
on said property, save 1nd except the installation of 
a chain link fence whici. replaced an existing fence on 
the property, said fence being installed by Gunnison 
Valley Hospital. 
9. (Omitted for purposes of brevity). 
l 0. (Omitted for purposes of brevity). 
ll. (Omitted for purposes of brevity). 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR 
WHEN IT RULED THAT AN ENDORSED AND NEGOTIATED 
CHECK DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WRITTEN CONTRACT FOR 
THE PURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY BY PLAINTIFF. 
A. THE CHECK ITSELF CONSTITUTES A MEMORANDUM WHICH 
SATISFIES THE STATUTES OF FRAUDS. 
Utah Code Annotated 25-5-l provides as follows: 
"Estate Or Interest In Real Property. - No 
estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor 
-6-
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any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing sub-
scribed by the party creating, granting, assign-
ing, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agents thereunto authorized by writing." 
Although the Utah Court has never directly determined 
whether a check constitutes a contract or a sufficient memor-
andum to take an oral agreement out of the Statutes of Frauds, 
other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. In Cousbelis vs. 
Alexander, 315 Mass. 729, 54 N.E. 2d 47 (1944), the Plaintiffs' 
sought specific performance on a factual situation similar to 
the instant case. In Cousbelis, the Defendant was the owner 
of three lots, comprising of 14,300 square feet on Galvin Road, 
Watertown. This was the only land owned by the Defendant in 
Watertown. The Defendant orally agreed to sell and the Plain-
tiff to buy, this land at thirty-two cents per square foot. 
On September 1st, 1941, the Plaintiff handed the Defendant a 
check for $200.00, payable to the Defendant, wholly in the 
Plaintiff's handwriting, on the face of which was written, 
"deposit for land in Galvin Road, Watertown price 32¢ a ft.". 
The court ruled that this check was a memorandum sufficient 
to satisfy the Statutes of Frauds: 
It "need not be a formal document intended to 
serve as a memorandum of the contract; but it 
must contain the terms of the contract agreed 
upon - the parties, the Locus (if an interest 
in real estate is dealt with), in some circum-
stances the price, .... and it must be signed 
by the party to be charged or by someone author-
ized to sign on his behalf." .... In the nature 
of things there is no reason why the memorandum 
-7-
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cannot be written on a check. "The form of the 
memorandum is immaterial, if its contents 
adequately set forth the agreement." (Citing 
with approval, Hurley vs. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, 
546, 96 Am Dec. 671. 
The wording in the instant case "l/2 payment on land as 
agreed -other l/2 paid when deed delivered" would indicate in 
and of itself that the purchase price was to be the total sum 
of $700.00 and that GREGERSON and JENSEN had "agreed" on the 
land to be purchased. T 48:13-15. The balance of the purchase 
price was to be paid when the deed was delivered which could 
not be done instantly because of an existing mortgage and the 
need for an accurate description. That description is supplied 
by the Warranty Deed dated "October ___ , 1971 ". The prepara-
tion, knowledge and non-delivery of this deed should have been 
taken into consideration by the lower court pursuant to the 
parol evidence rule. Mathis vs, Madsen, l Utah 2d 46, 261 P2d 
952 (1953). 
In Guinand vs, Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P2d 467 
(1969), the issue before this court was whether or not a letter 
in which partners unilaterally promised the Plaintiff an un-
divided ten percent interest in the partnership violated the 
Statute of Frauds since the partnership consisted of lease-
holds and interest in land. This court stated the following 
concerning the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 25-5-l, 
(1953, as amended): 
From careful attention to the wording of that 
section it will be seen that there is no re-
quirement either that the instrument in writing 
demonstrate a valid consideration, or that it be 
-8-
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a complete contract in any other particular. All 
that is required is that the interest be grantee! 
or declared by a_writ~ubscribed by the party 
~o be charged. For the purpose of establishing 
that there was such a grant by the partnership is 
not essential that its assets be described with 
particularity. The purpose of the statute is 
that certain matters of great importance such as 
the conveyance of real estate should be protected 
against frauds and perjuries. As between the 
contesting parties here, that requirement is 
satisfied by the letter in question, and the 
granting of the ten percent (10%) of the interest 
in the partnership includes the grant of its assets. 
(Emphasis Added). 
The court in Guinand reversed the lower court and held 
the letter to be binding upon the parties. 
This court has also held that letters exchanged between 
the owners of interest in mining claims and mining operations 
were sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the provisions 
of the Statutues of Frauds pertaining to contracts for interest 
in lands and agreements that by their terms were not to be 
performed within one year of the making. Petersen vs. Hendricks, 
524 P2d 321 (Utah 1974): 
There was an exchange of letters between the 
parties which tended to show that the parties 
contemplated that each would have an equal interest 
in the claims and the proceeds of any ore extracted 
therefrom. While these letters do not precisely 
set forth the terms of an agreement nor do they 
describe the claims, nevertheless, it was the 
opinion of the trial court that they constituted 
a sufficient memorandum of the agreement to meet 
the requirements of the statutes of frauds, 
Section 25-5-3 and 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. (Emphasis Added). 
The endorsement of a check has been held to constitute a 
memorandum which negates the defense of the Statutes of Frauds. 
In Favor vs. Joseff, 16 Ariz. App. 420,494 P2d 370 (Ariz. 1972), 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the landlord accepted a check which represented the first years 
rent on the renewal of a lease, thereafter endorsed the check 
in her own hand, 8eposited it and received the proceeds. The 
court held against the landlord and determined that the lease 
agreement was valid and binding: 
The "memoranrlum" of the agreement "in writinq and 
signed by the party to be charged" (A.R.S. S~ction 
44-101) need not be a single document and that 
which has been "signed by the party to be charged" 
may be one of several documents. In our opinion 
this rule has been established by the Arizona 
Supreme Court by the following cases. Bartlett -
Heard Land and Cattle Company vs. Harris, 28 Ariz. 
497, 238 P2d 327 (1925); Carley vs. Lee, 58 Ariz. 
268, 119 P2d 236 (1941 ); and LeBaron vs. Crismon, 
100 Ariz. 206, 412 P2d 705 (1966). 
We hold that when Mrs. Joseff endorsed the check 
in her own hand, deposited the same for collection 
and received the proceeds thereof, she effectively 
signed a memorandum negating the defense of the 
Statute of Frauds as to the 1964 - 1969 lease. 
In King vs. Stanley, 197 P2d 321, (Cal. 1948), the 
parties exchanged letters concerning the purchase by plaintiff 
of defendant's property. The initial letter from J. W. King 
stated: 
In looking through the records, I find that you 
are the owner of two lots on 4th Avenue in the 
9100 block in Englewood, California. If you are 
interested in disposing of one I would be willing 
to pay $1,500.00 cash. Please reply to lst Lt. 
John W. King. 
After some counteroffers, escrows were prepared and 
thereafter defendant attempted to negate the transaction. 
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff/purchaser, and 
therein stated as follows: 
An Agreement for the purchase of sale of real 
property does not have to be evidenced by a 
-10-
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formal contract drawn with technical exactness 
in order to be binding. A memorandum of the 
agreement (Sec. 1624(4), Civil Code) is sufficient, 
and this may be found in one paper or in several 
documents, including an exchange of letters or tele-
grams or both .... , or in a letter from the vendor 
to the purchaser which is accepted and acted upon 
by the latter. 
In ~. supra, the court relied upon the description 
provided by separate document. The lower court in the instant 
case should have taken into consideration the unsigned deed 
from JENSEN to GREGERSON. ~states: 
The material factor to be ascertained from the 
written contract are the Seller, they Buyer, the 
price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, 
and the property to be transferred, describing it 
so it may be identified .... there is no questions 
that these essential items were clearly determin-
able here. The Defendants were the Seller. The 
Plaintiff was the person with whom she had nego-
tiated as Buyer and the fact that he sought to 
take title in the name of himself and his wife as 
joint tenants as a matter of convenience would 
not materially affect the agreement. As the trans-
action was to be cash it was immaterial to the 
Seller whether the Buyer took title in his own 
name, or with his wife, or with his father. The 
price to be paid was clearly $4,000.00 net; terms, 
cash on delivery of merchantable title. The 
property itself was sufficiently described in the 
parties' writings. 
Utah recognized this doctrine in Miller vs. Hancock, 
246 P 949 (Utah 1926): 
Respondent cites cases to the effect that 
separate writings may be construed together 
as containing all the terms of the contract, 
though only one be signed by the party to be 
charged ... " The doctrine of these cases is 
well-nigh elementary. It is at least supported 
by the great weight of judicial opinion. 
The trial court should have therefore construed the check 
as a memorandum defeating JENSEN's claim as to the application 
-11 -
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of the Statutes of Frauds. The trial court could have there-
fore looked to the Warranty Deed prepared within the same time 
frame to obtain the necessary descrirtion. 
In Leonard vs. l~oodruff, 23 li cah 494, 65 P 199 ( 1901), 
lett-ers were exchanged between tile •"'rties and deeds were pre-
pared and executed but never finally delivered. The Supreme 
Court enforced the contract and ruled that i , .. exchange of 
letters, which did not describe the property, constituted a 
sufficient compliance with the Statutes of Frauds: 
Do the letters which pass between the parties 
in connection with the Ueed to Bothwell con-
stitute such a memorandum of an agreement be-
tween the parties for an exchange of said real 
properties as meets the requirements of the 
Statutes of Frauds? We are of the opinion that 
they do. The only requirement about which there 
can be any question is that relating to the 
description of the properties to be exchanged. 
Each was properly described in the respective 
deeds executed by each of the parties with a 
view to the cor;'Lnnmation of the exchange. The 
fact that these deeds were never finally deTTVered, 
and did not affect as conveyances, and that one of 
them was not executed until after the terms of 
the exchan e offered b the res ondent had been 
accepted the dates of which offer, acceptance, 
and the acquiescence of the respondent are shown 
by Exhibits D, F, and G), did not destroy their 
effect as written memorandums signed by the parties 
to be charged, or as evidence of the agreement to 
make the exchange. Jenkins vs. Harrison, 66 Ala. 
346, 355 and cases cited; Thayer vs. Luce, 22 Ohio 
St. 62, 74-76; Bowles vs. Woodson, 6 Grat. 78; 
Parrill vs. McKinley, 9 Grat. l, 58 Am Dec. 212. 
Again, the answer, which admits that the negotiations 
therein mentioned related to the properties which 
are accurately described in the complaint, and 
which, as we have stated, resulted in the agreement 
to make the exchange, is a sufficient designation 
of the properties to meet that requirement of the 
Statutes of Frauds. (Emphasis Added), 
-12-
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B. TO RENDER THE CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE WOULD BE 
TO PERPETRATE A FRAUD ON APPELLANT. 
The purpose of the Statutes of Fraud has long been recog-
nized that its purpose is to prevent the perpetration of a fraud. 
Plaintiff's principal attack on the judgment of 
the trial court involves the application of the 
Statutes of Frauds. His contention is that the 
statutes prohibits the original contract from 
being declared valid and binding on the original 
signers. We approach this question by directing 
attention to the principal that the statute should 
be used for the purpose of preventing fraud and not 
as a shield by which fraud can be perpetrated, 
Jacobson vs. Cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah 1949). 
Had GREGERSON tendered to JENSEN cash instead of the 
check, the Statutes of Frauds would likely have direct applica-
tion. In Hunter vs. \~etsel, 84 N. Y, 549 (1881) the court states: 
The purpose and object of the statute should 
not be forgotten. Its aim is to substitute 
some act for mere words, to compel the verbal 
contract to be accompanied by some fact not 
likely to be mistaken, and so avoid the dangers 
of treacherous memory or down right pergury. 
The delivery of the check was such an act. 
The giving of a check is an overt act much 
easily proved, and less susceptible to miscon-
struction or pergury than the payment of a sum 
in currency. It is objected that a draft or 
check of a debtor is only conditional payment, 
and not satisfaction of the debt for which it is 
given, in absence of some agreement to the con-
trary. That, it is submitted, has nothing to do 
with the application of the Statutes of Frauds. 
The statute is not concerned with the legal affect 
of the payment; it says nothing about the payment 
being unsatisfaction, wholly or in part, of the 
vendor's claim. The purpose of the Statutes of 
Frauds is fully satisfied by the physical delivery of 
the instrument, the overt act indicating that 
there was a bargain between the parties. 
C. IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THE CONTRACT 
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BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO HAVE BEEN ORAL, THE DOCTRINE OF 
"PART PERFORMANCE" REMOVES THIS MATTER FROM THE STATUTES 
OF FRAUDS. 
GREGERSON maintains that the check itself constitutes a 
written contract between himself and JENSEN. However, in the 
event the Court determines the agreement to have been oral, 
payment of one-half of the purchase price constitutes part per-
formance to take the case out of the Statutes of Frauds. 
It is anticipated that JENSEN will rely upon the recent 
Utah case of Holmgren Brothers, Inc. vs. Ballard, 534 P2d 611 
(Utah 1975). The facts in Holmgren are distinguishable on their 
face. The check that was delivered was made payable to someone 
other than the landowner and negotiation of the same was con-
ditional, Furthermore, no part of the money represented by 
that check was ever paid to defendant and the court construed 
the same to be a conditional offer. 
It is submitted that the agreement reached between 
GREGERSON and JENSEN in the instant case, and the subsequent 
payment of one-half the purchase price, meets the standard set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Holmgren: 
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, 
definite, mutually understood, and established 
by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony, or 
other evidence of the same quality. In addition, 
there must be acts of part performance which in 
equity are considered sufficient to take the case 
out of the Statutes of Frauds: ( 1) Any improvements 
made must be substantial, or valuable, or beneficial. 
(2) A valuable consideration is demanded by egui!J. 
(3) If there is possession, such possession must be 
actual, open, definite not concurrent with the 
vendor, but it must be with the consent of the 
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vendor. (4) Such acts as relied on must be exclu-
sively referrable to the contract. (Emphasis Added). 
In Holmgren, the court addressed itself as to the necess-
ity of payment: 
Where, as here, payment is advanced as one of 
the acts of part performance, it must be delivered 
to, and accepted by the vendor, in discharge of 
part, or all of the purchase price, 
It is undisputed that JENSEN received the sum of $350.00 
and has had the full use of said money since September 30th, 1971. 
Partial performance by payment was also recognized by 
the Utah Supreme Court in LeGrand Johnson Corporation vs. 
Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 158, 486 P2d 1040 (1971 ), which held that 
plaintiff was not barred by the Statutes of Frauds were plain-
tiff had advanced $44,000.00 for the development of quarries 
and defendant had orally agreed to convey an interest in said 
mining claims to the plaintiff. 
POI NT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN IT 
RULED THAT A SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXIST 
WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE COURT TO SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE 
THE CONTRACT FOR THE REASON THAT THE COURT FAILED TO 
RECOGNIZE THE WARRANTY DEED PREPARED AFTER APPELLANT 
GREGERSON DELIVERED ONE-HALF OF THE PURCHASE PRICE 
TO RESPONDENTS JENSEN. 
In this case, GREGERSON and JENSEN both acknowledged that 
they went to the real property in question, that it was behind 
JENSEN's house and that JENSEN "kicked the ground" as to where 
the point of beginning was to be. Furthermore, the property 
··1as enclosed on all four sides by a fence, with one section of 
the fence separating the subject property from JENSEN's home. 
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The unsigned and undated deed accurately describes the subject 
property (Affidavit of Louis B. Cardon, licensed abstractor, 
In Support Of Motion For A New Trial. Designation of Record on 
Appeal No. ?1) and appears to have been done by someone with 
skill and competence in land surveying. Even without the deed, 
however, the lower court could have determined the amount of 
property which JENSEN agreed to sell to GREGERSON. In Jacobson 
vs. Cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah, 1949) the court states: 
"Plaintiff's next attack revolves around the 
claim that the original contract is unenforce-
able because the property is not described with 
certainty and definiteness. We overrule this 
contention. People who reside in far away rural 
communities cannot be charged with unreasonable 
accuracy in describing unsurveyed land. The only 
reasonable means by which a person can describe 
property located on a public domain, and which 
has never been surveyed, is by reference to natural 
monuments. The original parties to the contract 
could not have described the land by meets and 
bounds without going to the expense of running a 
survey. They apparently considered this unnec-
essary as all parties knew the exact location of 
the property involved; had been familiar with, and 
used it for many years; had described it in all 
documents by reference to fences, natural monu-
ments, size and occupancy. In spite of the mis-
descriptions in the record, the original owners 
knew and the present litigants know the location 
of the piece of property in dispute," (Emphasis 
Added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently recognized the obliga· 
tion on the part of the trial court to make a determination as 
to the property purchased where there is a dispute as to the 
actual boundary line. In Stauffer vs. Call, (Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, filed January 9th, 1979, Case No. 15468), 
the reference in the description in the contract was to natural 
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bo u 11 dar i e s w II i c h cons i s ted of s tone wall s and w i r e fences . The 
lower court ruled the contract unenforceable, primarily because 
of the ambiguity in description. The Supreme Court reversed 
and stated: 
"The court should take testimony as to what was 
said and done and then decide what was the legal 
description of the land included in the agreement 
to purchase. He should order a conveyance of that 
land to Stauffers upon the payment of the balance 
due pursuant to the written contract." 
The court also in Stauffer acknowledged that the land 
values in the Southern Utah area have greatly increased since 
the contract was made. Likewise, land values in Gunnison, 
Sanpete County, Utah, have increased considerably in value. 
Furthermore, the property in question borders the local hospital 
which increases its value. T 37:29-30; T 31:1-4. JENSEN, by 
refusing to convey the real property is now in a position to 
sell the property at a greatly enhanced price to other parties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Only at the trial of this matter on the merits did 
GREGERSON and his attorney become aware that a Warranty Deed 
had been prepared and was in the possession of JENSEN and his 
banker. The failure of JENSEN to properly answer the interrog· 
atory propounded to him was clearly prejudicial to GREGERSON's 
presentation of the case. 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
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that: 
that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the Court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment .... " 
In the early case of Klopenstine vs. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 
57 P. 712 (Utah, 1899), the court set forth the well established 
rules concerning newly discovered evidence: 
"It is well established that, to entitle a 
defeated party to a new trial on the ground 
of newly-discovered evidence, it must appear 
(1) that he used reasonable diligence to dis-
cover and produce at the former trial the newly-
discovered evidence, and that his failure to do 
so was not the result of his own negligence; (2) 
that the newly-discovered evidence is not simply 
cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not insuf· 
ficient if it is simply to impeach an adverse 
witness; (4) it must be material to the issues, 
and so important as to satisfy the court, by 
reasonable inference, that the verdict or judg-
ment would have been different had the newly-
discovered evidence been introduced on the former 
trial; (5) that the defeated party had no oppor-
tunity to make the defense, or was prevented from 
doing so by unavoidable accident, or the fraud 
or improper conduct of the other party, without 
fault on his own." 
In this case, the standards set by the Supreme Court in 
Klopenstine are applicable. It cannot be said that the dis-
covery of a deed with an accurate description of the property in 
question is not a critical issue in this case and would likely 
affect the result of a new trial. Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah 
122, 247 P2d 644, (Utah 1952). 
From the facts of this case, it is clear that the conduct 
of JENSEN in failing to properly answer the interrogatory could 
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be held to be misleading, unfair, unjust, or culpably negligent 
to justify the need for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The equities of this case are overwhelmingly in favor 
of GREGERSON. 
l. This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and order the specific enforcement of the contract entered 
into between GREGERSON and JENSEN, using the description provided 
by the Warranty Deed discovered by GREGERSON only at the time of 
trial; or 
2. This Court should reverse the trial court and 
require it to take testimony concerning the reasonable value 
of the land and award judgment in favor of GREGERSON and against 
JENSEN for that amount. 
3. This Court should determine that Plaintiff/Appellant 
GREGERSON had established a prima facie case and that the trial 
court errored in granting judgment against Plaintiff/Appellant 
GREGERSON, no cause of action. 
4. This Court should remand this case to the trial 
court and order a new trial. 
' DATED this /-/·_c. /·"day of June, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ j / / .. 
/"~/ ~~. . ;/ / /) // ' ~- '-- ~~_.k/1-X<>'~ 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Prudential Plaza - Suite D 
110 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
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) 
Space Above for Recorder's Use 
WARRANTY DEED 
Je.rr.ea L. Jen!3en and Nedra Jansen, his wi!e , grantors 
oC Gunnison City ,Cocntyo! Sanpete , Stat.. of Utah, 
hereby CONVEYS and WARRA..'."rS to Nod 0. Gregerson and Dixie c. Gregerso 
his wife, as joint tenants,. "With t'ull rights of survivorship, and 
noc as tenants in common 
Gunnison City , Co=ty of 
Cor thesum of Ton and 00/100- - - - - -
:.he following described tract of land in Sanpete 
Sanpete 
, granteeo 
, Stat.. of Utah 
-- ~LLARS, 
County, Stat.. of Utah, tc>-wit: 
Beginning at a point North 89° Vest 2.52 chains and North 1° East 
1.48 chains from the Southeast corner of Block 18, Plat "A" Gunnison 
Clt7 Survey; thence North 89° ~est 0.48 ot a ohain, thence North 
l' East 1.82 chains, thence South 84° 30 1 East 1.13 chains, thence 
South 89° East 0. 60 of a cha!n, thanes South l" West 1.47 chains, 
thence Nor'th 89° Wast 1.25 ci::.ains, thance South 1° West 0.26 of a 
\: chain to the point of beginn!.ng. (, 
I,' 
I' Together with all the improvemants and appurtenances thereunto 
I, belonging or in anywise apper~aining thereto. 
1\'lTh'ESS the hands of said ~~Tan tors, this day of October • 1971 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Se..npe te 
On the 
f>erson;illy appeared before me 
·--------------
}~ 
day of October ,19 71 
James L. Jensen and }l"edra Jensen, his wife 
the si!{llers ot the above instrument. who duly acknowlcd;ed to me that tho y executed the 
own e. 
''
11' commission expires ··-···· ____ Residinz in ----···-··------·····------
I i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
on Mr. Dale M. Dorius, Attorney at Law, P, 0, Box U, 29 South 
him, postage prepaid, this 
Uta~//Mf02, 
~day of 
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